In three previous blog posts, we have discussed recent inventorship issues surrounding Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) and its implications for life sciences innovations – focusing specifically on scientist Stephen Thaler’s attempt to obtain a patent for an invention created by his AI system called DABUS (“Device for Autonomus Bootstrapping of Unified Sentence). Most recently, we considered Thaler’s appeal of the September 3, 2021 decision out of the Eastern District of Virginia, which ruled that under the Patent Act, an AI machine cannot qualify as an “inventor.” Continuing this series, we now consider the USPTO’s recently filed opposition to Thaler’s appeal.
Our previous blog posts, Artificial Intelligence as the Inventor of Life Sciences Patents? and Update on Artificial Intelligence: Court Rules that AI Cannot Qualify As “Inventor,” discuss recent inventorship issues surrounding AI and its implications for life sciences innovations. Continuing our series, we now look at the appeal recently filed by Stephen Thaler (“Thaler”) in his quest to obtain a patent for an invention created by AI in the absence of a traditional human inventor.
The situation is familiar: an employee leaves one company to go work for another, or perhaps to found her own start-up. She may be working on the same problems that she faced at her former workplace, and in the same technological space.
The employee’s work at her new company results…
The question whether an artificial intelligence (“AI”) system can be named as an inventor in a patent application has obvious implications for the life science community, where AI’s presence is now well established and growing. For example, AI is currently used to predict biological targets of prospective drug molecules, identify candidates for drug design, decode genetic material of viruses in the context of vaccine development, determine three-dimensional structures of proteins, including their folding form, and many more potential therapeutic applications.
Over the last seven years there has been commotion in Obviousness-type Double Patenting (“ODP”) practice. One of the latest cases to spur a considerable amount of interest is Mitsubishi Tanabe Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., which is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”). While a detailed review of this case is not the intent of this post, as a fair number of practitioners have provided insightful coverage, an historical overview is helpful for framing the decision and issues that need clarification from the CAFC.
In an opinion issued on March 3, 2021, the Supreme Court of Delaware, one of the top commercial courts in the country, overturned a jury verdict that Glaxo Group Limited and Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (collectively, “GSK”) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when GSK disclaimed all the claims of a lupus treatment patent it had licensed from Biogen thereby extinguishing its obligation to pay ongoing royalties on sales of its lupus treatment drug. The court’s reasoning and the outcome raise important considerations for life sciences practitioners in the transactional, litigation, and patent disciplines.
Recent Precedential Decisions Applying Fintiv
When a company is sued for patent infringement, often one early strategic consideration is whether to counterattack the patent’s validity at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in a parallel post-grant proceeding such as inter partes review (IPR) or post-grant review (PGR). Although the PTAB has recently conformed certain practices more closely to litigation—notably, its claim construction and indefiniteness standards—it remains a valuable venue for patent challengers seeking a relatively speedy, predictable, and cost-effective process.