BridgeBio’s recently announced sale of an FDA Priority Review Voucher for $110 million reflects a robust secondary market for these regulatory fast passes. Prices for Priority Review Voucher (“PRVs”) reflect the high stakes involved in the timing of the FDA review of a new drug application (“NDA”) or biologic license application (“BLA”). While the purchase of a voucher can help a drug’s sponsor shorten the time to market, it can also put immediate cash in the hands of the voucher seller seeking to tide itself over, particularly during a period of flagging investor interest in the biopharma sector.
In the wake of the nomination of Kathi Vidal as Director of the USPTO, there will be significant attention paid to the agency’s responses to calls from both the executive and legislative branches to remake the agency’s perceived role in shaping the pharmaceutical pricing landscape.
How is orphan drug exclusivity affected when the FDA-approved use for an orphan drug is arguably narrower than the treatment of the rare disease it was designated for?
By way of background, a sponsor can obtain orphan drug exclusivity when the FDA approves an application for a drug that has first been designated under 21 U.S.C. § 360bb of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) for a “rare disease or condition.” Id. § 360cc(a). Except in any of three statutorily prescribed circumstances (§§ 360cc(b), (c)), the FDA cannot approve another application for the “same drug” for “the same disease or condition” for seven years after the first approval.
The European Union has been a leader in recent years when it comes to regulatory reform intended to protect individuals’ privacy, safety, and health. As Europe leads the way, regulators in the United States often follow suit on the federal or state level. The EU’s passage of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), intended to protect personal data, is a prime example. Several years after GDPR enactment, California adopted a privacy rights statute of its own, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). Other states have since passed comprehensive consumer privacy laws, with similar proposals under consideration in many state legislatures. This progression should serve as a reminder for those in the United States to keep a watchful eye on European regulatory activity as a potential harbinger of things to come in the U.S.
As we mentioned in the early days of the pandemic, COVID-19 has been accompanied by a rise in cyberattacks worldwide. At the same time, the global response to the pandemic has accelerated interest in the collection, analysis, and sharing of data – specifically, patient data – to address urgent issues, such as population management in hospitals, diagnoses and detection of medical conditions, and vaccine development, all through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Typically, AIML churns through huge amounts of real world data to deliver useful results. This collection and use of that data, however, gives rise to legal and practical challenges. Numerous and increasingly strict regulations protect the personal information needed to feed AI solutions. The response has been to anonymize patient health data in time consuming and expensive processes (HIPAA alone requires the removal of 18 types of identifying information). But anonymization is not foolproof and, after stripping data of personally identifiable information, the remaining data may be of limited utility. This is where synthetic data comes in.
When a pharmaceutical company withdraws a product from the market, the basis for the withdrawal can affect whether a competitor can commercialize a generic version of that product. A generic cannot be approved if, in the FDA’s view, the product was withdrawn for “safety and effectiveness” reasons.
But how does the FDA reach that conclusion? A newly filed case may shed some light on the Agency’s decision-making process.